In 1999, People & Things reflected on the issue of candidate selection and offered a critique of the methods employed by both political parties to choose their candidates.
These methods are consistent with the overall approach to political party management that is preferred across th Caribbean that prioritises “gut feel” and emotional loyalties over science and logic.
The article was motivated by the Democratic Labour Party’s (DLP) decision to wipe the slate clean and in so doing erase all but their two sitting MPs, forcing 26 unsuccessful candidates to submit letters of application seeking consideration for the 2003 election.
The method identified then is one of several scientific methods, but this one is incredibly simple and relies on the electoral data from the previous election that is comprehensive, reliable and publicly available.
This discussion has once more become relevant since both parties have recently expressed some interesting preferences which should prompt the type of analysis which People & Things initiated two weeks ago. On that occasion, reference was drawn to the case of former junior finance minister Clyde Mascoll, who former Prime Minister Owen Arthur seems determined have in his team in a place other than St Michael North West.
‘Safe seat’
One, of course, can appreciate Arthur’s anxiety to embrace Mascoll into his fold, but his apparent determination to place him in a “safe” seat adds to the already high level of dysfunction within the Barbados Labour Party (BLP).
The relevant statistical data is, however, compelling and suggests that Mascoll should remain in St Michael North West and seek to exploit his historical association with that seat that he won, lost, recaptured and lost again.
It is also noteworthy that while Mascoll lost in the last election, his personal performance was actually not half-bad since his 2 230 votes amounted to 47 per cent of total votes polled, which reflected a +5 per cent swing or improvement on his 2003 performance. In that election, the BLP’s total national swing was of the order of -9 per cent, which made Mascoll the BLP’s best performer in that poll in terms of electoral swing or personal improvement.
Arguably, if Mascoll was able to positively improve his level of support (so impressively) in a year that the nation’s voters were hostile to the BLP, he should have little difficulty defeating the same candidate now, especially since the global economic environment is being so very helpful to the BLP.
It can therefore be argued that the BLP’s decision to relocate Mascoll is either an act of extreme cowardice or political folly, but either way it illustrates the manner in which candidates should not be selected in a well-managed political party.
On the other side of the political fence, there has also been some drama and, in this instance, the DLP has jettisoned two unsuccessful candidates. These two constituencies can be taken in turn, starting with the potential battle in St James North where the DLP has substituted one Husbands for another.
Some of the arguments in support of the more youthful Husbands are compelling. However, one cannot deny the fact that Austin Husbands (like Clyde Mascoll) returned a relatively decent performance in 2008. On that occasion, his personal performance was a 12 per cent swing which compares favourably with the DLP’s nine per cent at the national level.
Husbands therefore outperformed the DLP in 2008, which is similar to his 2003 performance where he returned a 14 per cent swing in comparison to the DLP’s eight per cent on that occasion.
Certainly, this analysis would need to give way if a contemporary poll of public opinion suggested that Senator Harry Husbands was preferred by constituents. However, in the absence of that data, it would be difficult not to conclude that Austin Husbands was indeed a “good” candidate and one who had earned his right to try again to secure this seat.
The situation in Christ Church West is somewhat different, however, since the review of electoral data there does not support the candidacy of Mr Taan Abed. In the last election, Abed’s personal swing was seven per cent which is two per cent below that of the DLP’s national performance.
Since there is no margin of error applicable in this swing analysis, that performance would be considered “below par”, especially as the slide in BLP strongholds is normally more extreme in DLP swing years (as reflected in St Peter +/-14 per cent and St Thomas +/-12 per cent).
Unsatisfactory
In situations like this, the DLP might want to ascertain the reasons for this type of unsatisfactory performance before taking action against Abed, since there can be any number of good or bad reasons why a candidate has underperformed.
In all of these scenarios, one common factor is that both the DLP’s and BLP’s timing is very poor since both parties are now trying to settle potentially contentious constituency battles with an election due in just over one year.
In the case of the DLP, the fact that it is in office means it can use the machinery of governance to placate the unsuccessful candidates. However, this would require the DLP’s leadership to move more swiftly than is the norm and at any rate will not necessarily help the DLP to capture either of these seats.
In the past, Arthur has skilfully managed the fallout in places like Christ Church West.
However, he no longer has access to political patronage and one is therefore anxious to see the mechanisms he uses on this occasion.
Notwithstanding all that has been said here, the outcome in all three of these constituencies is unlikely to change because of these 11th-hour decisions, but the fallout will always be negative, which is undesirable with an election due shortly and therefore reflects poorly on the management of our political parties.
• Peter W. Wickham (peter.wickham@caribsurf.com) is a political consultant and a director of Caribbean Development Research Services (CADRES).
