THE CRIMINAL JUSTICE SYSTEM has been under the spotlight within the past week during the debate on the Penal System Reform Bill which passed through the two houses of Parliament. The bill provoked serious comment by some commentators and members and, inevitably, the question of hanging was raised; but the issue that occupied centre stage, especially in the Senate, was the question of time it took for criminal matters to be disposed of.
Senator Arthur Holder, for example is reported to have told the Chamber that it could take as long as ten years between suspects being charged and their cases being heard.
Other reports in the Press within very recent times have thrown up cases where accused people have been on remand for as long as six calendar years in one case and four in another.
It has to be a matter of some concern to right thinking members of the public that such a situation exists, and the senator suggested, among other things establishing more courts to deal with the flood of cases coming out of the Magistrates’ Courts, and using the latest technology for the recording of evidence by magistrates, thereby eliminating the laborious recording of the evidence by longhand.
These worthwhile suggestions are eminently sensible, but the solution is not as easy as that, as the senator would appreciate – given his training in law and in the social sciences, and especially his exposure to the problems of the justice systems elsewhere, in which he worked as a professional.
An important question, recognised by human rights law, is the financial cost of establishing more courts, and the engagement of more professionals and ancillary staff to operate these additional courts.
With the best will in the world it cannot be easy for policymakers of any hue sitting in the halls of power trying to share limited finances among the other pressing demands of the vulnerable in the society, and a justice system which is seen in the eyes of many shortsighted voters as throwing money after the criminals.
But people on remand are not criminals, because our Constitution which safeguards us all, vulnerable and non-vulnerable alike, declares that a person charged is presumed to be innocent until proven guilty. And it is the process by which we separate the “guilty from the non guilty” that is being questioned.
A day in prison is a day in prison, whether the person detained is guilty or not, and in this context the reason for the detention does not diminish the sting of loss of freedom, nor the deprivation of opportunities in life otherwise available to an accused who might eventually be found “not guilty”.
The constitutional right to a fair hearing within a reasonable time may also be compromised in situations of undue delay, for spending four, five, or six years on remand before trial may constitute a breach of the fundamental rights of a person accused of a criminal offence.
One of the hallmarks of a democracy is the manner in which it treats those who may breach its laws and then look to the self same system of law for protection. The case for speedier trials is not a plea to be soft on crime.
It is a matter of adhering to those principles of the rule of law in our Constitution, which protect us all from arbitrary and capricious behaviour by the state; and these rights include freedom of the Press and freedom of movement, and protection against arbitrary search, among others.
Hence we support any reasonable calls for an urgent study of ways in which we can speed up the criminal justice process to reduce or eliminate long periods of time spent on remand pending trial. These delays are becoming a blot on our system of criminal justice.
